




Blackmail is an exotic crime, and quite possibly, as we shall see,
a rare one. But it exerts considerable fascination at both the
popular and the theoretical level, and it has evoked a substantial
literature1 to which this Article seeks to contribute by emphasizing
economic and strategic considerations, positive and empirical
analysis, the relation between blackmail and private law enforce-
I judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior
Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School. I thank Gary Becker, Jennifer Brown,
Richard Epstein, David Friedman, William Landes, James Lindgren, Stephen
Schulhofer, Andrew Shapiro, Steven Shavell, and participants in a faculty seminar
at DePaul University Law School, as well as the other participants in this Sympo-
sium, for exceedingly generous and helpful comments on a previous draft of this
paper, and Mary Jane DeWeese, Jin Kim, Harvey Lind, and Brian Weimer for
valuable research assistance. An unpublished note by Gary Becker, The Case
Against Blackmail, makes several arguments parallel to mine; I was not aware of his
note when I wrote my paper. My paper was also written independently of the
other articles in this Symposium but has many parallels to the papers by Ginsburg,
Isenbergh, and Shavell.
1 See the following articles by James Lindgren for the best introduction to the
scholarly literature as it stood before this Symposium: BlackmaiL" On Waste,
Morals, and Ronald Coase, 36 UCLA L. REV. 597 (1989) [hereinafter Lindgren, On
Waste]; Kept in the Dark: Owens's View of Blackmail, 21 CONN. L. REV. 749 (1989);
Secret Rights: A Comment on Campbell's Theoy of Blackmail, 21 CONN. L. REV. 407
(1989); In Defense of Keeping Blackmail a Crime: Responding to Block and Gordon, 20
Loy. LA. L. REv. 35 (1986); More Blackmail Ink: A Critique of Blackmail, Inc,
Epstein's Theoty of Blackmail, 16 CONN. L. REv. 909 (1984); Unraveling the Paradox
of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (1984) [hereinafter Lindgren, Unraveling the
Paradox].
By "blackmail," I mean the attempt to trade silence for money. The term is
sometimes used in law as the equivalent of extortion, which is the extraction of
money by threats generally, of which threats to reveal incriminating or embarrass-
ing information are a subset. Shavell's article in this Symposium analyzes threats
in general as well as blackmail; I discuss other threats too, but only in passing.
The descriptive literature on blackmail is sparse. The best work is probably MIKE
HEPwORTH, BLACKMAIL: PUBLIcITY AND SECRECY IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1975), but it
is limited to British law. For philosophical discussions of blackmail that are
partially parallel to the economic analysis of this Article, see JOEL FEINBERG,
HARMLESS WRONGDOING 238-76 (1988) and ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 90-103
(1987).
An interesting form of blackmail that I do not discuss occurs when a criminal
defendant threatens to disclose state secrets if the state prosecutes him.
(1817)
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ment2 and between blackmail and the right of privacy, and the
neglected but theoretically illuminating case of blackmailing a
person about an involuntary condition such as sexual preference.
I argue that blackmail is, and should be, forbidden because,
although ostensibly a voluntary transaction between consenting
adults, it is likely to be, on average, wealth-reducing rather than
wealth-maximizing.
The economic cast of my analysis is no accident. Economists3
and economically minded lawyers have found the prohibition of
blackmail more problematic than have other students of the legal
system. Economists tend to be great believers in voluntary
transactions. Blackmail is, in the usual case, a voluntary transaction
between competent adults. The blackmailer possesses information
about his prospective victim that the latter would prefer not be
made public. The victim values the blackmailer's silence more than
the blackmailer values the right to publicize the information.
Accordingly, the blackmailer sells the victim the right to the
information. Since blackmail is a crime, the actual transactions do
not much resemble those of ordinary commercial intercourse, but
that is an artifact of their illegality. If blackmail were legal,
blackmailers and their customers (today called "victims") would
enter into legally enforceable contracts whereby the blackmailer
would agree for a price never to disclose the information in
question; the information would become the legally protected trade
secret of the customer.
Economists are troubled by prohibitions against voluntary
transactions unless the transactions impose involuntary costs on
third parties. Who might the third parties be in the case of
blackmail? We can, at least for the moment, elide that question by
taking a slightly different approach to freedom of contract, one that
asks whether prohibiting a particular class of contracts would raise
or lower the net social product.4 This is the easiest approach to
2 On this point, see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private
Enforcement of Law, 4J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 42-43 (1975).
3 Besides those works discussed by Lindgren, see WALTER BLOCK, DEFENDING
THE UNDEFENDABLE 53-58 (1976) [hereinafter BLOCK, DEFENDING THE UNDEFEND-
ABLE]; Walter Block, Trading Money for Silence, in ECONOMIC IMPERIAuSM: THE
ECONOMIC METHOD APPLIED OUTSIDE THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS 157 (Gerald
Radnitzky & Peter Bernholz eds., 1987) [hereinafter Block, Trading Money].
4 Ronald Coase, in the paper criticized by Lindgren, see Lindgren, On Waste,
supra note 1, at 602, also asks the question this way, but, as Lindgren points out,
he does not analyze it satisfactorily because he does not consider the possible
social value of blackmailing as a method of law enforcement. See Ronald H.
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contracts made under duress, a class of contracts with which
blackmail is often grouped.5 If an assailant points a gun at you,
saying, "Your money or your life," you will doubtless be very eager
to accept the first branch of this offer by tendering your money.
There are third-party effects, but the essential objection to the
transaction is that the victim would prefer a regime in which such
transactions were outlawed, because it would reduce the probability
of his receiving such unwanted offers (a qualification is discussed
later). In this case a restriction on freedom of contract protects a
contracting party ex ante.
Similarly, people desperately eager to pay blackmail would
prefer not to be blackmailed and would therefore prefer a regime
in which blackmail is forbidden. That cannot be decisive against
legalizing blackmail, because others might benefit. But it shows that
blackmail cannot be approved on economic grounds just because it
is a voluntary transaction between consenting adults; not all such
transactions are wealth-maximizing. One alternative to economic
analysis in both the duress and the blackmail cases is to play with
the meaning of "voluntary," for example by confining "voluntary"
acts to those in which severe constraints are absent; but this just
adds a layer of uncertainty.
Another way of bringing out the commonality between duress
and blackmail is to note that both involve threats. Threats have the
interesting property that both parties involved-the threatener and
the person threatened-are made worse off if the threat is actually
carried out. This fact does not by itself condemn a threat as
inefficient, since the deterrence theory of punishment is constructed
on the premise that threatening is a good way of getting people to
behave. But extortionate threats, whether to beat or kill or lie-or
tell the truth-that is, threats designed to induce the person
threatened to pay the threatener, are not intended to regulate
behavior. They are intended to transfer wealth from the person
threatened to the threatener. Such a transfer does not, on its face,
Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REv. 655, 670-76 (1988).
5 Indeed the line between threatening to do something (such as instigating a
legal proceeding) and threatening to tell something (such as that the person
threatened has committed a legal wrong) is often faint. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Tucker, 142 A.2d 786 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (upholding a conviction for intimidat-
ing a debtor by simulating delivery of court process). For a comparison of the two
types of threat, see Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 553,
555-57 (1983) (distinguishing a threat of physical violence from a threat to take
one's business elsewhere).
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increase social wealth; indirectly, it diminishes social wealth by the
sum of the resources employed by the threatener to make his threat
credible and of the victim to resist the threat. So, prima facie at
least, it is a sterile redistributive activity, like (simple) theft.
6
Of course, this seemingly sterile redistributive activity might
confer a social benefit; that is the argument for blackmail. But if
there is no good reason to suppose it does, then, on purely
economic grounds, blackmail should be forbidden.
I. A TAXONOMY AND A NEW ECONOMIC THEORY OF BLACKMAIL
The best way to anatomize blackmail is to distinguish among the
seven categories of acts or conditions that a blackmailer might
threaten to reveal:
7
1. Criminal acts for which the blackmailer's victim has been
duly punished.
2. Criminal acts that were not detected, hence not punished.
3. Acts that are wrongful but not criminal, such as acts that
the common law classifies as torts.
4. Acts, whether civilly or criminally wrongful, of which the
blackmailer (or his principal) was the victim.
5. Disreputable, immoral, or otherwise censurable acts that
do not, however, violate any law, or at least any commonly
enforced law.
6. Involuntary acts or conditions that are a source of poten-
tial shame, ridicule, or humiliation.
7. Any of the above, except that the blackmailer's victim did
not in fact commit the act for which he is being black-
mailed.
6 The idea of common law crimes, and their counterpart, intentional torts, as
pure coercive wealth transfers can be traced to Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathe-
dral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1124-27 (1972), and, with specific reference to
extortion, to George Daly &J. Fred Giertz, Externalities, Extortion, and Efficiency, 65
AM. ECON. REV. 997, 999 (1975); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs
OF LAW 217-68 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing the economic nature and function of the
criminal law). Ginsburg's paper for this Symposium, which was written in 1979
and widely circulated although not published, first applied the idea to blackmail.
See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, Blackmail An Economic Analysis of the
Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1993).
7 Feinberg, see supra note 1, at 240-58, presents a somewhat similar taxonomy.
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A. Category 1: Criminal Acts for Which the Blackmailer's Victim
Has Been Duly Punished
Here, allowing blackmail would interfere with the penalties
prescribed by law, and by doing so might reduce the social product.
Or it might not. But we know that blackmail is a costly redistribu-
tive activity, and if we have no reason to suppose that it would
confer significant third-party benefits, then the fact that we cannot
be certain that it would not confer any such benefits is not a good
reason to carve it out of the general prohibition of extortionate
threats.
Suppose the blackmailer's victim is a person who had been
convicted of a crime, served his time, incurred all collateral
penalties such as loss of civil rights, and eventually been pardoned.
Years later the blackmailer appears on the scene and threatens to
expose the victim's criminal past. If the blackmailer is allowed to
collect money from the victim in exchange for silence, then to the
victim's prescribed penalties will be added the amount of the
blackmail, an amount equal to the lower of (1) the cost to the victim
of the stigma of being exposed as an ex-convict and (2) his financial
resources. Of course, the blackmailer may be legally entitled to
divulge the information, depending on how broadly the tort of
invasion of privacy is defined. But if deterred from engaging in
blackmail, he will lack-though not completely, as we shall see-an
incentive to expend the resources necessary to obtain the informa-
tion in the first place.8 So in all likelihood the information about
the victim's past will not be divulged. This may seem a shame, since
the information might have some, even considerable, value to
people who transact with the victim. But that is irrelevant. If
blackmail were permitted, the information would not be divulged
either. Blackmail is payment for secrecy. The only effect of
blackmail would be to increase the victim's punishment by the
amount of the blackmail paid. If the original punishment was
optimal, that punishment plus the blackmail would be excessive and
the transaction costs of the blackmail would be an additional social
waste.
8 The expenditure will not always be great; the blackmailer may come by the
information casually, at little or no cost. But if blackmail were legal, there would
be incentives to engage in blackmail on a commercial scale. For further discussion
on this point, see infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
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That "if" is a big one, because punishment is rarely optimal in
any strong sense. But we must consider the situation as it would
appear to a legislature mulling over the question whether to forbid
blackmail. If dissatisfied with the combination of probability and
severity of punishment for crimes, the legislature could alter the
combination directly. If satisfied, it will want to forbid the
blackmail in Category One of my taxonomy. Granted, this assumes
that the legislature has decided to use a system of public punish-
ments. An alternative would be a system of private punishments, of
which blackmail would be (as we shall see) a natural component.
But legislative preference for public punishments is a fact, and may
be (again, as we shall see) efficient.
Granted, too, blackmail is not the only private conduct that adds
to public punishments. An employer who refuses to hire a person
with a criminal record adds a market sanction to the person's
official punishment. The difference is that the employer benefits
from imposing this additional sanction; presumably it is a cost-
minimizing policy. A blackmail transaction does not confer an
equivalent social benefit, once its deterrent effect is discounted
because of concern with overdeterrence. It merely transfers wealth
to the blackmailer. The reason is that blackmail does not actually
increase the stock of information in a socially useful sense. This is
a paradox. Legalizing blackmail would increase the resources
devoted to acquiring information about people's criminal acts and
other behavior or dispositions to which opprobrium attaches, and
how could an increase in the resources devoted to gathering
information not increase the amount of information? The amount
gathered has to increase, all right, but the amount disseminated
need not; for the information gathered by the blackmailer may be
suppressed.
He will suppress it, it is true, only if suppression is worth more
to the blackmail victim (and hence to the blackmailer) than it is to
third parties. Otherwise he will disseminate it to them, and if he
does, his activity will have brought about a net increase in the usable
stock of information after all. The blackmailer is not interested in
secrecy per se, but in money. If someone will pay more for the dirt
he has gathered than the blackmail victim will pay, the blackmailer
will sell to that third party rather than rebury the information he
has unearthed. But these cases will be rare even if the information
is socially valuable. Often the benefits of the information will be
highly diffuse, being spread across a variety of actual and potential
transactors with the blackmail victim, some of whom may not even
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be identifiable. Blackmailing a person who is trying to conceal from
his future sexual partners that he is a carrier of the AIDS virus
would be an example. It may be difficult to transform these diffuse
benefits into a commensurate gain appropriable by the blackmailer.
Also, it is difficult to sell a secret without revealing it before the
sale. If the blackmailer tells the victim's wife that he has some
information about the victim that she would value highly, how does
she know how much to pay? If he reveals the information to her
before she signs a contract, she will not pay anything unless she
wants proof, say, for use in a divorce action. Solutions to analogous
problems in the area of legitimate intellectual property such as
inventions and entertainment exist, but they are not simple. The
more costly a transaction, the less likely it is to be made. For both
reasons it seems a fair guess that allowing blackmail would not
increase the usable stock of information significantly. Indeed, we
shall soon consider the possibility that it might actually reduce that
stock.
This conclusion is important. If blackmail is unlikely to increase
the stock of usable information, one possible third-party benefit
from allowing the practice is eliminated from consideration.
Another possible benefit is to make criminal punishments more
severe, but this may well be an additional cost rather than a benefit.
Therefore, the case for carving an exception to the crime of
extortion for blackmail in our first category has not been made.
B. Category 2: Criminal Acts that Were Not Detected,
Hence Not Punished
Here the blackmailer is in effect a supplementary law enforcer.
His efforts increase the probability that offenders will be caught but
by doing so interfere with a criminal justice system that combines
relatively low probabilities of apprehension and conviction with
relatively severe punishments-a combination that, under certain
assumptions, will optimize law enforcement. 9 Expected punish-
ment cost, which determines deterrence, is the product of the
severity and the probability of punishment. Within some range,
increasing the fine for an illegal activity by another dollar is
essentially costless and enables a reduction in the resources devoted
to catching and prosecuting offenders (and hence the costs incurred
9 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL.
ECON. 169, 180-85 (1968).
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in these activities) without any impairment of deterrence. Private
enforcers, however, may treat an increase in the fine as an induce-
ment to invest more resources in enforcement rather than, as
intended, as a signal to invest fewer resources.1" I say "may"
rather than "will" because the higher fine, by deterring more
offenders, may raise the costs of the private enforcement indus-
try.
11
Private enforcement can be disruptive in another way as well.
Suppose police obtain valuable information by paying informers.
The price they pay will be lower if blackmail is forbidden, since
competition between police and blackmailers for information
concerning guilt would drive up the price of the information. 12 So
blackmail might actually reduce the usable stock of information.
We cannot be certain. Blackmail increases the incentive to gather
information, so more is gathered, and some of it is disseminated
rather than reburied, either because the blackmailer and his victim
fail to come to terms or because someone offers the blackmailer a
higher price than the victim is willing and able to pay. But
blackmail also enables some information to be concealed that would
otherwise be divulged.
Now suppose that we wanted to reduce rather than increase the
severity of criminal punishments and, correspondingly, increase
rather than reduce the investment of resources in catching crimi-
nals. Under a system of private law enforcement, we would
10 The analysis is more complicated, but the results are basically the same, if
punishment takes the form of imprisonment rather than a fine. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 2, at 25.
11 I am indebted for this point to Steven Shavell. See also A. Mitchell Polinsky,
Private Vernus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980).
12 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theoy of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 1193, 1200-01 (1985). Shavell makes the same point in a different form in
his article for this Symposium when he argues that effective punishment might be
greatly reduced if law enforcement officers or crime victims were free to blackmail
criminals. Both these groups have good information about criminals, and the
punishment they would impose would consist of monetary exactions necessarily
limited by the financial resources of the criminals. See Steven Shavell, An Economic
Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmai Extortion, and Robbetj, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1877, 1901 (1993). But this is just to say that if blackmail were lawful, the
price that the government would have to pay such an informant for his informa-
tion would often exceed the criminal's total wealth. In other cases the informant's
reward would be less than the criminal's resources, and blackmail would then
provide adequate punishment.
Presumably, bribe-taking by law enforcement officers would be forbidden
even if blackmail were allowed generally, but that does not affect Shavell's
analytical point.
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encounter the mirror-image problem of too little rather than too
much enforcement. Private enforcers would treat the reduction in
penalties as a signal to reduce rather than increase their investment
in enforcement, because the returns would be lower.1 3 But this is
another reason not to rely on blackmailers, viewed as private law
enforcers (which in a functional sense they are), as part of our
criminal law enforcement system.
The basic argument in this section is thus a simple one:
blackmail is a form of private law enforcement, so in areas where
private law enforcement is banned (and we have seen that there are
economic reasons why one might want to ban it in some areas),
blackmail should be banned. The implication is that in areas where
private law enforcement is permitted, blackmail-like activities,
though not called by that pejorative name, will be permitted; and we
shall see shortly that they are.
The argument is not conclusive, however, for banning blackmail.
To begin with, private enforcers might have so much lower costs of
operation than public enforcers as to make private enforcement
more efficient on balance than public enforcement. Private
enterprises generally have lower costs than public ones for the same
quality and quantity of output. A blackmailer, moreover, will
frequently come upon incriminating information by accident. His
blackmail victim might be his spouse, coworker, employer, compan-
ion in crime, client or patient, student or teacher, or social
acquaintance. Of course if blackmail were legal there would be an
incentive to expend more resources on obtaining incriminating
information about people; there would be a blackmail industry,
though maybe not a very large one, at least if we confine our
attention to the blackmailing of people who have committed crimes.
One reason for distinctive criminal penalties, such as imprisonment,
is that criminals rarely have financial resources commensurate with
the injury they do.14 Such people will not be able to pay huge
blackmail either, and this will limit the scale of the industry. But by
how much? Far more people commit crimes than are caught and
1" I am indebted to David Friedman for this point. It assumes of course that
when punishment takes the form of imprisonment rather than fines there are
bounties for enforcers; otherwise, they would have no incentive to enforce the law.
14 This is the rationale for criminal law stressed in the economic literature. See
Posner, supra note 12, at 1204-05; see also Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the
Optimal Use of Nonmonetaty Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1238
(1985).
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prosecuted, so the aggregate gains from lawful blackmail might be
huge.
One might try to defend the blackmailing of criminals (whether
or not they have been caught and formally punished) differently, as
a way of generating a more discriminating scale of punishments.
15
The people most susceptible to blackmail on account of their past
crimes are, first, those with the largest incomes and, second, those
who occupy jobs or other situations in which the expected cost of
a repetition of their crime would be highest. Examples are the
convicted embezzler who is once again working in a bank and the
wife-slayer who has remarried. Allowing blackmail would enable a
greater use of monetary sanctions because a fine, payable out of
current assets, plus blackmail payable out of future income would
together constitute a heavier such sanction than a fine by itself
would. Thus, blackmail might actually promote Becker's program
of optimal sanctions, 16 and it would optimize the preventive effect
of criminal punishment by steering criminals away from the
activities in which the expected costs of their recidivism would be
highest. But employers may, as we have seen, be able to protect
themselves. And sentencing courts have the power to impose
conditions on a criminal's subsequent activities, such as that he keep
out of a particular profession (this is a common sanction in
securities cases); this may be a simpler solution than blackmail.
But there is more to be said on behalf of blackmail as an
ancillary method of law enforcement. The threat of blackmail
would not only deter criminal activity directly; it would raise the
costs of that activity by inducing criminals to take steps to reduce
the likelihood of being blackmailed by each other.17 Also, some
people (especially criminals) may be more willing to engage in
blackmail than to report incriminating information to the police,
even if there is a reward; for the information may have been
obtained illegally, or in circumstances that reveal the informer's own
illegalities. So here is a class of cases where allowing blackmail
would yield socially productive information even though the
information was not disseminated to the authorities: it would be
socially productive because it would make the criminal pay for his
crime.
" I am indebted to William Landes for this suggestion.
16 See Becker, supra note 9.
17 See infra text accompanying note 42.
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The discussion in this section may seem inconclusive. Certainly
no confident conclusion that allowing the blackmailing of undetect-
ed criminals would undermine the enforcement of the criminal laws
is possible. But that is not necessary in order to justify the continued
prohibition of blackmail. As a costly and apparently sterile
redistributive activity, blackmail fits the economic definition of a
common law crime.1 8 The speculative argument that blackmail
might serve a socially productive role as an auxiliary form of law
enforcement does not justify removing it from the prohibited
category, when the opposite argument, that legalizing blackmail
would actually undermine optimal law enforcement, is equally
plausible.
This conclusion can be criticized as giving undue weight to the
status quo, but in evaluating that criticism one should distinguish
between an analytical evaluation and a policy recommendation. So
far as the first is concerned, all that can be said is that we do not
know whether blackmail of undetected criminals is, on balance, an
efficient practice. We can translate that conclusion into a recom-
mendation either to retain or abolish the prohibition of blackmail
only by bringing in other considerations. One might be a presump-
tion against government intervention in private affairs that is not
demonstrably efficient; another, a presumption against the expendi-
ture of scarce political capital on an effort to change laws that are
not demonstrably inefficient. Although I cannot prove that
blackmail is on balance inefficient, I believe that it is and therefore
the second presumption weighs more heavily with me.
C. Categoty 3: Acts that Are Wrongful but Not Criminal,
such as Acts that the Common Law Classifies as Torts
With respect to this category of acts, the law has given the
exclusive right of enforcement to the victim, and although over-
enforcement is not a problem (because for most private wrongs the
probability of detection is close to one, and therefore the optimal
sanction approximates the social cost of the wrong), the law's
decision to give the victim a property right in rectifying the wrong
would be undermined by allowing a third party to blackmail the
injurer-defendant. Blackmail would deplete the wrongdoer's
resources and thus make it more difficult for the victim of the
wrong to enforce his right to damages.
1 9
18 See supra note 6.
19 This noint assumes that the blackmailer would ordinarily approach his victim
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D. Category 4: Acts, Whether Civilly or Criminally Wrongful;
of Which the Blackmailer (or his Principal) Was the Victim
The difference between Categories Two and Three is that when
the victim of wrongdoing, rather than the state, is the authorized
enforcer, practices superficially indistinguishable from blackmail
often (though not always, hence the need for the fourth category)
are permitted. It is broadly true that "[n]o one seems to object to
a person's collecting information about his or her spouse's adulter-
ous activities, and threatening to disclose that information in a
divorce proceeding or other forum, in order to extract maximum
compensation for the offending spouse's breach of the marital
obligations."2 0 Professor Lindgren reminds us that we are walking
on a tightrope here, because there is a division of legal opinion on
"whether it is or should be illegal to threaten to disclose damaging
information to the press in order to settle a contract or tort
claim." 21 A threat merely to litigate a civil suit, however, and not
to trumpet the defendant's conduct to the press or other media, is
much less likely to be classified as blackmail than a threat to lodge
a criminal complaint.2 2 This is so even though many civil suits are
in fact settled because the defendant does not want the details of his
misconduct to become known, as they would be if the case went to
trial: trials are public. Settlement agreements often contain confi-
dentiality clauses, and these agreements are not classified as
blackmail.
This analysis implies that if private enforcement were permitted
generally-if the criminal laws, for example, were privately en-
forced-then blackmailers would merely be private enforcers who
had compromised their enforcement proceedings, much as public
law enforcers compromise their enforcement proceedings through
plea bargaining. If this were the case, it would be hard to object to
blackmail.
before the latter was made to pay damages.
20 Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 42-43.
21 Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox, supra note 1, at 697-98.
22 See Block, Trading Money, supra note 3, at 184.
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E. Category 5: Disreputable, Immora, or Otherwise Censurable Acts
that Do Not, However, Violate Any Law, or at Least Any Commonly
Enforced Law, and Category 6: Involuntary Acts or Conditions that
Are a Source of Potential Shame, Ridicule, or Humiliation
Professor Landes and I once remarked that
[t]he social decision not to regulate a particular activity is a
judgment that the expenditure of resources on trying to discover
and punish it would be socially wasted. That judgment is under-
mined if blackmailers are encouraged to expend substantial
resources on attempting to apprehend and punish people engaged
in the activity.
23
Lindgren points out, however, that society does "allow substantial
resources to be spent on private enforcement of such moral rules
and norms without criminalizing such enforcement." 24 His most
colorful example is that "President McKinley once denied someone
an ambassadorship because years before McKinley had seen the man
act selfishly on a streetcar-he had failed to give his seat to an old
washwoman carrying a heavy basket."25 Lindgren's criticism has
merit, but a full evaluation must wait upon the consideration of
some other issues.
To begin with, the qualification in the definition of Category
Five ("or at least any commonly enforced law") is important. Some
"immoral" conduct, such as fornication, adultery, and homosexual
intercourse, is nominally criminal in many states but so rarely
punished as to call into question the existence of any social
commitment to extirpate the conduct. When a blackmailer
threatens to reveal the victim's immoral conduct, this rarely will be
interpreted as a threat of criminal prosecution, though sometimes
as a threat to stir up a divorce proceeding. Still, the very overinclu-
siveness of the criminal law is a possible reason against legalizing
the blackmail in Category Two (criminal acts committed but not
punished). Allowing such blackmail would bring into existence an
industry devoted to enforcing criminal laws that remain on the
23 Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 43.
24 Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox, supra note 1, at 698.
25 Id. at 699. The cost of enforcement in this example is subtle: it is the loss
of the benefit that the man would have conferred on society as an ambassador.
This characterization assumes that McKinley declined to appoint the man in order
to punish him for his selfishness, rather than because his selfishness made him less
fit for the post than McKinley would have believed had he not witnessed the
incident with the washerwoman.
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books because of legislative inertia26 or because of their symbolic
importance to influential interest groups but that society as a whole
has decided not to enforce. That decision might be undermined by
allowing blackmail. One can only say "might" and not "would"
because the decision may have been based on considerations
peculiar to criminal law and not engaged by informal methods of
"law enforcement," including blackmail. This criticism parallels
Lindgren's.
2 7
It will help in getting a handle on these questions to approach
Category Five through Category Six (involuntary acts or conditions
that are a source of potential shame, ridicule, or humiliation).
Indeed, the original motivation for this paper came from my
research into the law and economics of sex,28 a field rich in cases
in this category. Suppose a man is a homosexual in the sense of
having a strong, and basically lifelong, preference for sex with other
males. This condition is almost certainly involuntary.29 Of course,
having a homosexual preference and acting on it are different
things; the preference may be involuntary but the homosexual acts
themselves are not. So, to begin, let me assume that the blackmail-
er's victim is a homosexual and confides this to a friend but refrains
from homosexual acts, and in fact is married. The "friend"
threatens to tell the victim's wife about his homosexuality unless the
victim will pay him to keep silent. This is a classic blackmail threat,
yet it is difficult to see what the benefits would be of allowing it to
be made.3 0 In fact the net social product would probably be
diminished if this class of contracts were permitted.
To see this, consider the effects of such permission. One would
be to raise the cost of having a homosexual preference-of being a
homosexual. Another would be to increase the resources expended
on discovering homosexual preference and on negotiating contracts
to prevent the discovery from being revealed. A third would be to
26 The separation of powers in state as well as federal governments makes it
more difficult to repeal laws than in a unitary system of government, such as the
parliamentary system.
27 See Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox, supra note 1, at 698-99.
28 See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
29 See id. at 101-05; see also RICHARD GREEN, SEXUAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW 63-
84 (1992).
30 The focus here is not upon the benefits from disclosing the information-
information which may be significant (for example to the blackmail victim's wife).
The information will not be disclosed if the blackmail transaction is successful, and
it would be more likely to be successful if blackmail were legal.
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increase the resources devoted to concealing homosexuality and to
other defensive measures against the threat of blackmail.
The second effect cannot be dismissed with the argument that
the resources that would be devoted to blackmailing, if it were a
lawful activity, would be slight because most blackmailers concerned
with intimate acts probably obtain their information as a byproduct
of their transactions with the victim (the spurned lover, etc.) rather
than through elaborate investigation; even so, a fair amount of
sexual blackmail involves entrapment of the victim.3 1 To repeat
an earlier point, the illegality of blackmail reduces the amount
expended on investigation and entrapment, making that amount a
poor predictor of what the costs of blackmail would be if blackmail
were legal. Moreover, in a legal market, it is doubtful that the
casual blackmailer would deal directly with the victim, because the
latter would want a reliable guarantee that the blackmailer would
not renege on his promise of silence. Blackmail would tend to be
dominated by "reputable" blackmail enterprises, whose costs would
not be trivial.
If raising the cost of being a homosexual has no allocative effect
because homosexuality is an involuntary and unalterable condition,
then legalizing blackmail would channel real-and, I have just
argued, considerable-resources into bringing about a pure
redistribution of wealth from the homosexual to the blackmailer.
There would be no net social gain but instead a net social loss equal
(at a minimum, as we shall see) to the resources expended in the
blackmailing. Here is where the involuntary character of being a
homosexual is important, which is what caused me to specify a
separate Category Six for cases of involuntary, unalterable condi-
tions. If a condition cannot be changed by incentives, taxing it is
unlikely to have any allocative effect. No gain, much cost.
I am oversimplifying. There would be some allocative effects.
Some homosexuals would be less likely to marry, to enter tradition-
ally heterosexual or homophobic occupations (notice the parallel to
the occupational effects of allowing blackmail with respect to past
criminal convictions), or in short to try to "pass" as heterosexual,
since a known homosexual cannot be blackmailed. Others, however,
would try all the harder to pass, in an effort to reduce the risk of
blackmail by raising potential blackmailers' costs of information.
Both classes of response would be defensive measures akin to the
3' See infra note 33.
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purchase of a security system by a householder fearful of burglary.
If we anticipated a social gain from homosexuals' making either
greater or fewer efforts to pass as heterosexuals, and if we knew
which effect would be more likely on balance if blackmail were
permitted, then we could evaluate a suggestion that allowing
homosexuals to be blackmailed would generate social benefits. But
there is no basis in existing knowledge for either judgment. For
example, while it could be argued that a male homosexual who
marries a woman to whom he does not disclose his sexual prefer-
ence commits a fraud upon her and therefore that such marriages
should be discouraged, we do not know whether allowing blackmail
would reduce the number of such marriages by increasing the cost
of the marriage to the homosexual or would increase the number of
such marriages by increasing the benefits of marriage to homosexu-
als through its camouflage effect (married men are presumed
heterosexual). In the face of this uncertainty, the safest guess is that
allowing the blackmailing of homosexuals would yield a net social
loss equal to the resources expended in blackmailing and in
defending against blackmailing.3 2 Additional resources would be
squandered on efforts to entrap people in compromising situa-
tions.33
The analysis is more complicated if the focus is switched from
the condition of being homosexual (in the sense of having a
homosexual orientation) to homosexual acts. One way a homosexu-
al can reduce the probability of detection is by reducing the number
of homosexual acts he engages in, and in particular the number of
different homosexual partners he has. Indeed, if he simply screens
his partners more carefully, this will raise his sexual search costs and
so indirectly reduce the number of his sexual partners. If, perhaps
32 Block, insisting that there would be a real social gain in allowing blackmail,
makes the remarkable argument that blackmail benefits homosexuals "by making
the public more aware and accustomed to homosexuality" and by "engender[ing]
an awareness on the part of members of a group [i.e., homosexuals] of one
another's existence." BLOCK, DEFENDING THE UNDEFENDABLE, supra note 3, at 57-
58.
33 Hepworth gives examples of these types of expenditures, which he calls
"entrepreneurial blackmail." HEPWORTH, supra note 1, at 74-75. For an American
illustration, see State v. Harrington, 260 A.2d 692, 694 (Vt. 1969), where the
defendant, a lawyer, procured a woman to entice his client's husband to commit
adultery with her, and then threatened to expose the husband's adultery in order
to obtain better divorce terms for the wife. A recent case of this sort is United
States v. Lallemand, No. 92-2178, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6423 (7th Cir. Mar. 29,
1993).
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because of the AIDS epidemic, we thought it a good idea to create
incentives for homosexuals to reduce the number of their homosex-
ual acts or homosexual sex partners, allowing blackmail might
generate a net social benefit. This seems unlikely, though. The
expected cost of AIDS to homosexuals who do not practice safe sex
is very high and must swamp the expected cost of blackmail (more
precisely, the higher expected cost of blackmail if blackmail were
legal). Put differently, a person willing to risk AIDS is probably
willing to risk being blackmailed. This conclusion requires
qualification, however, because the blackmail risk would soar if
blackmail were decriminalized. Nevertheless, the blackmail "tax"
would probably remain a minor factor in most homosexuals'
decision calculus. What is more, the danger of infection with AIDS
is greatly reduced by the use of condoms, and blackmail would do
nothing to induce such use.
Here is an even clearer example of a case in Category Six: A
man is impotent, and is obtaining treatment from a sexual therapist.
Suspecting Victim's condition,34 a blackmailer follows him to the
therapist's office, discovers (without breaking any law) what the
problem is, and blackmails him. What would be the consequences
if such blackmail were permitted? Not less impotence, surely, but
more. An impotent man would hesitate to seek professional
assistance for fear of increasing the probability that blackmailers
would discover his problem. The increase in impotence would
generate (after subtracting the reduction in the use of therapists'
services) a net social cost, to be added to the cost of the resources
'Jerky, agitated gestures in conversation or public speaking were once
thought an infallible symptom of impotence. Medical literature of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century taught that impotence had a rich and
observable symptomatology:
[C]ertain subjective symptoms were present.... Prominent among these
signs are pain in the back ... so that the subjects are tired out by com-
paratively slight exertions and walking. [T]here is dull, heavy pain in the
back of the head, the neck, the shoulders, which now and then become
flushed.... In other instances, the symptoms are .. . impairment of
memory, mental debility, depression, anxiety, or irritability.... In other
cases ... troubled and unrefreshing sleep, ... coldness of the hands and
feet, poor appetite, coated tongue ... vertigo, and constipation are very
common.
SAMUEL W. GROSS, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON IMPOTENCE, STERILITY, AND ALLIED
DIsoRDERs OF THE MALE SEXUAL ORGANS 37-38 (1881); see also John S. Haler, Jr.,
Spermatic Economy: A 19th Centmy View of Male Impotence, 82 S. MED.J. 1010, 1011
(1989) ("[T]he symptoms.. . included... inability to focus one's attention on any
subject, [and] stammering and quavering of the voice .... ").
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expended by the blackmailer. This is another example of defensive
and offensive expenditures on wealth redistribution that yield no
social gain.
Thus far I have been assuming that the victim's secret is worth
more to his potential transacting partners than it is to himself. As
such, the objection to blackmail is that, when successful, it bottles
up socially valuable information. In many cases, however, the secret
may be worth more to the victim than unmasking it would be worth
to others.3 5 Impotence is a good example. The condition will be
known to the man's sexual partners; and of what interest would it
be, except as a source of mild titillation, to anyone else? The
embarrassment to the victim if his condition becomes known to the
public may greatly outweigh the benefits of the information to the
public.
To summarize, Category Six involves the levying of a private tax
on an activity that either is unlikely to be discouraged by the tax or
that society has no interest in discouraging. Of course, from the
standpoint of public finance, a tax that has minimal allocative
effects is an ideal revenue raiser. But there is no social interest in
allowing one member of society to impose and collect a tax on
another member for his own use, especially when the blackmailer is
unlikely to pay tax on his blackmail income (if he were likely to pay
tax on that income, he could be regarded as a sort of tax collector).
In cases of this sort, blackmail really is the economic equivalent of
theft.
Category Five, consisting of disreputable but not unlawful acts,
is difficult to analyze because there is no enforcement scheme to be
disrupted and there are potential allocative gains from taxing
disreputable conduct (as with a pollution tax). The selfish man who
aroused President McKinley's ire might have behaved differently
toward the washerwoman if he had known that anyone on the
streetcar could have gone up to him and said, "Give me five dollars
or I will proclaim to the world that you are a selfish man." The
threat of blackmail would act as a tax on selfishness and thus make
us less selfish.
That would be one effect but another would be the manufacture
of phony reputations.3 6  Suppose McKinley had not seen the
35 See Gary S. Becker, The Case Against Blackmail 1 (Jan. 1985) (unpublished
manuscript).
36 The notion that people use the concealment of discreditable information
about themselves to enhance their success in the market for personal relations is
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selfish act on the streetcar but had been told about it by one of the
passengers (who, let us say, merely to.simplify analysis, was the only
one who had seen it). In a regime of lawful blackmail, that
passenger might have gone to a blackmailer and sold exclusive
rights to the information to him, and he in turn would have sold it
to the selfish man, who would, of course, have buried it. The
informant is silenced by blackmail.
Society has an informal and very cheap system of deterring the
lesser forms of wrongdoing: gossip. Its efficacy would be under-
mined by blackmail because the gossip would sell his information to
the blackmailer and thence to the wrongdoer and thereafter his lips
would be sealed. This scenario both underscores the analogy
between trade secrecy and lawful blackmail and illustrates how
blackmail can reduce rather than increase the usable stock of
information. It is true that, at the same time the efficacy of this
informal system of regulation was reduced by allowing blackmail, so
would be the need for it, because the tax effect of blackmail would
reduce the incidence of wrongdoing. But it cannot be assumed
that, overall, the amount of wrongdoing would be less. If it were
not less, then the costs of blackmail would be a deadweight loss.
This argument against Category Five blackmail is hardly
conclusive. The possibility that blackmail would be an efficient
intermediate method of discouraging relatively minor forms of
wrongdoing between the criminal law (effective but too costly) and
gossip (cheap but perhaps not very effective) cannot be excluded.
But, once again, the argument for allowing blackmail is too
speculative to make a strong case for decriminalizing this particular
form of extortion.
Consider, by way of analogy, the following argument: we should
allow extortion whenever it is founded upon the wrongdoing of the
victim. X obtains proof that Y is an adulterer, goes to Y, and
threatens to beat him up unless Ywill pay him $25. The possibility
that allowing such threats would reduce breaches of the marital
obligation at a cost commensurate with this benefit cannot be
excluded a priori, but seems altogether too conjectural to justify
making an exception to the laws against extortion. It is the same
with blackmail.
basic to the economic analysis of privacy. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcONOM-
ICS OF JUSTICE 232 (1981) ("[S]ocial, like business, dealings present opportunities
for exploitation through misrepresentation.").
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F. Category 7: Any of the Acts in the Previous Categories, but the
Blackmailer's Victim Did Not in Fact Commit the Act
for Which He Is Being Blackmailed
A blackmailer could attempt to blackmail someone with a threat
to accuse him falsely, but we should expect such cases to be rare
because the victim has a good remedy: sue the blackmailer for
defamation. The remedy is not perfect, however, because the
blackmailer may not have the resources to pay a legal judgment.
Criminalizing this form of blackmail can thus be viewed as backing
up the law against defamation.
II. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH
The analysis to this point has shown that there is an economic
case for the prohibition of blackmail; but this conclusion does not
exhaust the potential contribution of economics to the understand-
ing of the prohibition. Apart from earlier points, economic analysis
may explain why it is not blackmail for a person who gets wind that
another is about to disclose damaging information about him to
approach that person and pay him to keep mum.s 7 Allowing such
transactions is unlikely to give rise to an industry of dirt-seekers,
with all the squandered resources thereby implied, since the dirt-
seekers could not advertise for or otherwise seek out customers
(which would be blackmail) but would have to wait for the latter to
come upon them by chance.
Economic analysis can also cast light on why the crime of
blackmail is relatively recent3 8 and why it is regarded with great
distaste and punished severely in comparison with other nonviolent
thefts. A possible answer to the first question is that blackmail is
less likely to be common, and therefore less likely to be deemed a
social problem requiring a public remedy, in a society in which
people have very little privacy and, therefore, few secrets. In
addition, blackmail imposes fewer social costs in a system dominat-
ed by private rather than public enforcement, and the latter is a
relatively modern innovation.
One answer to the second question is that blackmail partakes of
the opprobrium visited on crimes that involve advance planning, as
s7 If the information concerns an undetected crime, however, the payee might
be deemed an accomplice after the fact in the commission of the crime.
" There appear to have been few prosecutions for blackmail before the
nineteenth century.
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distinct from impulsive crimes. Moreover, it is extremely easy for
a legislator, judge, or other public official to visualize himself or
herself as a blackmail victim: any public official is a prime target for
blackmail, and public officials are influential in the formation of
law. Furthermore, the probability of punishing a blackmailer may
be low. There appear to be, as we shall see, few prosecutions.
3 9
The blackmail victim does not want to reveal his secret to the police;
and in a public trial of the blackmailer,40 the secret may leak out
even if the blackmailer is intimidated by the prosecution into
keeping mum.
The blackmail victim may have two better choices than to go to
the police. One is to pay blackmail, for the rational blackmailer will
try to set a price that does not drive the victim to the police.
Another is to call the blackmailer's bluff, since if in retaliation the
blackmailer reveals the damaging information, there will no longer
be any incentive for the victim not to complain to the police; he has
nothing more to lose. The blackmailer whose victim defies him
faces a tradeoff between loss of reputation among his potential
victims if he does not carry out his threat and a greatly enhanced
probability of punishment if he does; and the former consideration
would weigh heavily only if blackmail were lawful, so that a
blackmailer could advertise his qualities to potential victims.
Knowing all this, many blackmail victims can be expected to thumb
their noses at the blackmailer and many other victims can be
expected to pay, leaving only a handful to complain. Because the
probability of punishment is very low, the punishment must be set
high to deter, and so blackmail will have the appearance of being a
serious crime.
There is another reason to expect (illegal) blackmailing often to
fail: a blackmailer cannot easily conceal his identity from the
blackmail victim. Unlike most crimes, blackmail requires explicit,
and often protracted, negotiations between the criminal and his
victim, and in the course of these negotiations the victim is likely to
learn the criminal's identity-especially since there are likely to be
only one or a few persons who could have obtained the information
39 See infra part III. We shall also see that this point is not decisive, hence the
hedged "may be."
focCriminal defendants in this country have a constitutional right to a public
trial, although measures are sometimes taken to conceal secret information,
including trade secrets. I have noted the analogy between blackmail and the theft
of a trade secret.
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used to blackmail the victim. Once the victim knows who the
blackmailer is, he has as potent a secret as the blackmailer: if the
blackmailer knows that the victim is a criminal, the victim knows
that the blackmailer is a criminal. The situation becomes implicitly
one of mutual blackmail, and the blackmailer cannot be confident
of coming out ahead.
The sophisticated blackmailer tries to avoid incriminating
himself by such ploys as informing the victim that he (the blackmail-
er) has incriminating information and asking the victim what he
should do with it. If the victim offers to buy it, without solicitation
on the part of the blackmailer, and the blackmailer accepts the offer
and sells, there is, in the contemplation of the law, no blackmail.
But this is a complicated minuet, in which one false step will turn
the transaction into blackmail. Moreover, if the victim makes no
offer, and the blackmailer responds by divulging the information,
the blackmailer has to worry that the victim may incite a prosecu-
tion against him out of anger, even if conviction is unlikely.
There is another side to this coin, however. By giving his victim
irrefragable proof of blackmail, the blackmailer reduces the
probability that he (the blackmailer) will renege on the blackmail
"contract" by going back to his victim with an additional demand for
money. He has armed his victim to resist him-indeed to blackmail
him141 But in partial offset to this ingenious point,42 it should
be noted that in many cases the victim's fear is not of disclosure to
the police, who may be uninterested in his shameful secret, but to
a spouse or other family member, or to an employer. In such a
case, the victim may have a strong incentive to complain to the
police-unless, realizing this, the blackmailer, once again, scales
down his price appropriately. It might seem that the victim would
be afraid of the blackmailer's disclosing the information to the
spouse, employer, or whomever, out of spite at being reported. But
as I have emphasized, a rational blackmailer, once caught, usually
41 This is similar to hostage-giving, another extralegal method of making a
credible commitment.
42 For which I am indebted to Steven Shavell, who has also directed my
attention to a mystery novel in which the blackmailer furnishes his victim incrimi-
nating information about himself (apart from the blackmail) explicitly to reassure
her that he is unlikely to renege on their deal by making a further demand upon
her. See LAWRENCE BLOCK, TIME TO MURDER AND CREATE 44-47 (Jove Books
1983) (1977). The novel describes another blackmail transaction, in which there is
a specified periodic payment so that the victim knows he's buying silence only for
a period and the blackmail price can be adjusted accordingly. Id. at 32-33.
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will keep mum in an effort to obtain leniency. Given the difficulty
of establishing reputation in an illegal market with few repeat
customers, considerations of reputation are unlikely to offset the
benefits of a lighter punishment.
Reference to "spite" suggests another qualification. A blackmail-
er who has a spiteful motive to reveal the victim's secret if the
victim does not pay up is a more credible blackmailer: his spite is
a form of precommitment. The blackmailer may thus be more
credible, but is he more effective? Maybe not. The victim may fear
that the spiteful blackmailer will reveal the secret whether or not he
pays up; if so, he has nothing to gain from paying. There is another
reason, unrelated to spite, for not paying anything to a blackmailer.
Paying anything may confirm the blackmailer's belief in the accuracy
of the discrediting information that he has about the victim, and so
raise his price, thereby making a further demand inevitable.
Indeed, every time the victim pays, he gives the blackmailer more
information concerning the value of the blackmailer's information
about him. This is an especially important consideration in regard
to blackmailing with a false accusation. By paying blackmail, the
victim gives the accusation credibility, thus increasing the optimal
blackmail price. The broader point is that such payment, however
modest, makes it more difficult for the victim to deny the truth of
the blackmailer's information should it ever be divulged.
All things considered, it must often, perhaps usually, be rational
for a blackmail victim either to thumb his nose at the blackmailer
or to pay a trivial amount in hush money (its triviality reflecting the
potency of the first alternative). If this is right, however, then actual
cases of blackmail will tend to be ones in which victims are naive.
Rational blackmailers will not approach people who are likely either
to defy them43 or to bargain them down, but will concentrate on
the psychologically or otherwise vulnerable. This selection bias will
make the blackmailer seem especially vicious and predatory, and will
thus create pressure for severe punishment.
Is severe punishment warranted from a deterrent standpoint?
This is a difficult question. Certainly some punishment is warrant-
ed, even though blackmail may be rare; if blackmail is rare, it may
43 "Publish and be damned" was the Duke of Wellington's response to a
blackmailer. Wellington wrote these words on a blackmailing letter he received
from the publisher of the memoirs of Wellington's mistress, Harriette Wilson,
then posted it back to him. See 1 ELIZABETH LONGFORD, WELLINGTON: THE
YEARS OF THE SWORD 166-67 (1969).
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be so in part because it is punished. By making blackmail a crime,
the law does three things: (1) gives the blackmailer an incentive not
to reveal the victim's secret after the victim has complained to the
police, which makes such complaints more likely and therefore
blackmail less likely; (2) makes it impossible to conduct blackmail in
the open; (3) prevents the blackmailer from offering his victim a
legally enforceable promise of secrecy. The first effect is enhanced
by severe punishment, but the second and third are independent of
it-and the second alone may, by retarding the emergence of
professional blackmailers, largely confine blackmailing to intimates
of the victim. Intimates can extract concessions that cannot readily
be proved to be blackmail, and when proof is difficult, heavy
punishment may actually reduce deterrence, becausejuries are more
reluctant to convict in doubtful cases the heavier the punishment is.
If the blackmailer knows the victim's guilty secret, the victim is more
likely to treat the blackmailer well, but the latter could not be
proved guilty of blackmail beyond a reasonable doubt unless he
made a demand of some kind. This is related to the earlier point
that passive blackmail, as it were, is not a crime.
An intimate is likely to come across incriminating information
by accident, that is, without an expenditure of resources. So the
basic economic objection to blackmail-that it is, on balance anyway,
a sterile expenditure of resources-is weakened.4 4 But it would be
wrong to conclude that blackmail by intimates is a socially costless
activity. It raises the cost of intimacy, much as would a rule
requiring a person to testify to admissions made by his or her
spouse. Of course, intimacy can be used for bad as well as for good
purposes, so Walter Block is right to point out that legalizing
blackmail would increase the costs of conspiracy.
45
The third effect of the criminalization of blackmail, that of
eliminating property rights in the blackmailer's information, reduces
the amount of blackmail that the victim will pay, because he has no
protection against being blackmailed in the future. The amount
may fall all the way to zero, that is, the victim may pay nothing,
knowing that he is not buying anything: the blackmailer may return
the next day with a new demand. Again, this effect of criminaliza-
44 Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure Information, and the Law of
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-32 (1978) (arguing that property rights should not
be recognized in information acquired casually, but should be recognized in
information acquired as a result of a deliberate search).
45 See Block, Trading Money, supra note 3, at 186.
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tion does not depend on the severity of the punishment; indeed, the
effect could be achieved without criminal law simply by making
blackmail contracts unenforceable as a matter of contract law.
Note that if prohibition keeps blackmail prices low, potential
blackmail victims may prefer some blackmail to none, because there
will be cases where a blackmailer, who would otherwise report a
crime or other misconduct, can be bought off at low cost. This
added wrinkle suggests that a rigorous economic analysis of
blackmail would be complex and also that the existing situation, in
which blackmail is a crime but enforcement efforts are slight, may
be the best we can do. The paradox proposed is that an under-
enforced law may confer a greater net social benefit than a
vigorously enforced one even if the conduct that the law prohibits
has no social value. This is another reason why private enforcement
of law, which would tend to eliminate underenforcement, is not
always socially desirable.
III. THE CASES
It would be nice to be able to test the predictions implicit in my
analysis against a body of data concerning blackmail, but there are
no good data on this furtive underworld activity. The next best
thing-and it is by no means good-is published judicial opinions in
blackmail cases. Only a small fraction of legal proceedings result in
a published opinion, but it is still remarkable how few such opinions
there are in blackmail cases. A computer search of the approxi-
mately three million opinions published by West Publishing
Company in the last century disclosed only 124 blackmail cases. No
doubt my search missed many blackmail cases, because the word
often does not appear either in the statute under which a blackmail-
er is punished or in the opinions applying the statute; often
blackmail is lumped in with other forms of extortion. Nevertheless,
the remarkably small number of blackmail cases retrieved by my
search suggests, though does not establish, that blackmail is indeed
rarely prosecuted. The reason may be that it is rarely committed.
No one knows how rare or common blackmail is, but I have
suggested that it probably is rare because when blackmail is a crime
a rational blackmail victim will refuse to pay blackmail. Any offer
to pay will lead the blackmailer to increase his demand and, more
important, the victim knows that if he complains to the police, the
rational blackmailer, in order to minimize his punishment, will
refrain from divulging the blackmail secret.
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The following table classifies, so far as is possible to do, the 125
cases in the categories of Part II.46
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION OF REPORTED BLACKMAIL CASES










t Percentage of classifiable cases.
There is only one case in Category One-criminal acts for which the
blackmail victim has been punished. One reason may be that ex-
convicts cannot conceal their criminal record anyway and so cannot
be blackmailed about it. By far the dominant category (47% of the
classifiable cases) is Two-criminal acts for which the blackmail
victim has not been punished. This is not surprising. It is the only
category in which the victim has reason to fear that if he reports the
blackmail to the police he too will be prosecuted: hence the only
category in which blackmail is unlikely to be self-deterring. The
16 The numbers in the table sum to 125 because one case fell into two catego-
ries and was therefore counted twice. A list of the cases is attached as an appen-
dix to this Article. Recall that the categories are: 1. Criminal acts for which the
blackmailer's victim has been duly punished; 2. Criminal acts that were not
detected, hence not punished; 3. Acts that are wrongful but not criminal, such as
acts that the common law classifies as torts; 4. Acts, whether civilly or criminally
wrongful, of which the blackmailer (or his principal) was the victim; 5. Disreputa-
ble, immoral, or otherwise censurable acts that do not, however, violate any law, or
at least any commonly enforced law; 6. Involuntary acts or conditions that are a
source of potential shame, ridicule, or humiliation; and 7. Any of the above,
except that the blackmailer's victim did not in fact commit the act for which he is
being blackmailed.
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"involuntary" category is dominated by homosexual cases (five out
of the ten). A relatively small number of cases in the sample
involved a false accusation (12%); this is as predicted. In only 4%
of the cases was the blackmailer or his principal the victim of the
blackmail victim's blackmailable conduct; again, this is as expected.
Category Five (immoral acts) is dominated by fornication and
adultery cases. And only one case in the entire sample appears to
involve spite.
The cases are consistent with the economic analysis, but that is
not saying much: it would be reckless to generalize from so small
and possibly unrepresentative a sample to the "dark" figure of the
total number of blackmail incidents whether or not they lead to
prosecution, conviction, and a reported opinion.47 May further
research someday enlarge the sample! In the meantime, I am
content to argue that economic analysis is indispensable in guiding
investigation and analysis of a fascinating class of criminal behavior.
47 In this connection, I point out that almost 10% of a large sample (more than
1400) of male homosexuals reported having been blackmailed at least once by a
sexual partner. See PAUL H. GEBHARD & ALAN B. JOHNSON, THE KINSEY DATA:
MARGINAL TABULATIONS OF THE 1938-1963 INTERVIEWS CONDUcTED BY THE
INSTITUTE FOR SEX RESEARCH tbl. 545 (1979).
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